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Abstract
If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade
in a barter economy are reshaped. In a pure exchange economy, we examine
the case where two contestable consumption goods are vital to two agents
and initial endowments follow a binary distribution. In line with the existing
literature, we examine in a two–stage game how the equilibrium security of
claims to property is determined. We find that, in equilibrium, two different
regimes emerge, depending on the exogenous preference and appropriation-
effectiveness parameters: Peaceful coexistence and trade and appropriation,
with the former regime strictly Pareto-dominating the latter regime.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, economic theory emphasized the mutual benefits arising from market
transactions. One major assumption necessary for this theory was that individu-
als are rational and self interested. However, conflict, broadly defined as the use
of resources for creating or defending against appropriation, is entirely absent in
the Walrasian world. Together with the assumption of fully rational optimizers,
this restriction boils down to the assumption that property rights are perfectly de-
fined and costlessly enforced by an outside enforcement agency (outside enforcement
approach)1. If property rights are imperfect, the potential for conflict arises, and
with it an inefficient use of resources, such as the building of fences to guard initial
claims or the use of time and effort to steal. Early models of conflict have concen-
trated on the effects of appropriative activity in a pure production/appropriation
environment (Bush and Mayer (1974), Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaperdas (1992)).
However, they have neglected the potential for mutually beneficial economic activ-
ity, such as the trade of goods, despite potential conflict. Embedding appropriation
into economic modeling as an economic activity does not eliminate cooperation. In
fact, if cooperation occurs, it does so in the shadow of conflict, which exposes the
full costs of cooperation (in terms of endogenous transaction costs) and appropria-
tion (in terms of forgone exchange possibilities). Recent articles make allowance for
this insight.2 In allowing the agents to decide whether they exchange goods and/or
appropriate the claims of others, these authors incorporate what Hirshleifer (1994)
called the dark side of the force into classic general equilibrium models.
One difference between these models lies in the fact that they consider different cate-
gories of economic activity : The models of Anderton and Carter (2004) and Skaper-
das and Syropoulos (2002) include appropriation and exchange, whereas Anderson
and Marcouiller (2005), Hausken (2004) and Rider (1999) include appropriation,
production and exchange. Differences also arise with regard to the factors which are
subject to appropriation: Rider (1999) assumes that, in a two-consumption-good,
two-agent world, while inputs are unappropriable, productions are subject to appro-
priation. Each agent can invest effort in order to defend the homemade good or to
appropriate the foreign good, prior to the exchange of goods, provided that each
agent has the technology to produce one, and only one, of the two goods. Thus, the
potential appropriation appears as an ex-ante reallocation of outputs. Using a ratio
form of the contest-success function (CSF) he shows that uncontested exchange is
impossible, i.e. exchange is always accompanied by appropriation efforts of both
agents.3 Hausken (2004) shows in a similar environment4 that appropriation efforts
become zero in equilibrium, if productions are sufficiently vulnerable to appropria-
tion, i.e., appropriated goods may be partly destroyed.5 Only in this case, due to
1See Hafer (2000).
2See Anderson and Marcouiller (2005), Anderton (2000), Anderton and Carter (2004), Hausken
(2004), Rider (1999) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002).
3Contested exchange are at hand, if the benefit parties derive from transactions are contingent on
their abilities to enforce contracts. See Bowles and Gintis (1993).
4As in Rider (1999), there is a two consumption–good, two agent world. Each agent can produce
only one good, only productions are subject to appropriation and potential appropriation is
established prior to the trade of goods.
5Grossman and Kim (1995) make a similar assumption.
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the zero value of appropriation, property rights are perfectly secure. Anderton and
Carter (2004) present a model of vulnerable trade, in which the initial claims (two
consumption goods) of two agents are secure by definition, but goods are subject to
appropriation once they are offered for trade. They find that trade will only occur, if
the exogenously given relative effectiveness of appropriation compared to defensive
activities is low enough. Otherwise, both agents will decide to back off from trade
(autarky). Thus, perfectly secure property rights only emerge if the factor that is
subject to appropriation (exports) has a zero value.
We would like to present a model which includes appropriation and exchange in
a two-good, two-agent environment where each agent has initial non-overlapping
claims to property in the full stock of one consumption good. As in Rider (1999)
and Hausken (2004), each agent can divert a fraction of a scarce resource in order
to defend his initial claim or to appropriate the initial claims of the other, using
a ratio form of the CSF. In the spirit of Grossman (2001), the security of claims
to property depends on the fraction that each agent can successfully defend. This
fraction depends on the relative allocation of an uncontestable and scarce resource
(e.g. time) to both defensive activities (building a fortification) and appropriation
activities (use of offensive weapons). The relative effectiveness of both activities is
determined by an exogenous parameter.
We are especially interested in answering the question whether trade reduces the
incentives to engage in the contest. Therefore, in contrast to the aforementioned lit-
erature, we seek to find out whether the post-trade allocation of consumption goods
is perfectly secure. We assume that preferences towards both consumption goods
are strictly convex and monotonous. Hence, trade not only reduces the amount of
the good subject to appropriation but also decreases the marginal willingness to pay
for it. The question we pose is: Does the anticipation of potential appropriation force
the agents to engage in trade (which mutually reduces the gains from appropriation)
such that the resulting post-trade allocation of consumption goods is uncontested?
As in Grossman and Kim (1995), we would additionally like to capture the role of
defense as a deterrent to appropriation. Hence, we construct the following two-stage
game: In the first stage, each agent decides simultaneously and independently on
the amount of resource he wishes to sacrifice in order to defend his initial claim.
Given these irreversible decisions, the agents, in the second stage, decide about the
allocation of resource to appropriate the consumption good of the other agent as well
as the amount of goods they wish to export. In contrast to Anderton and Carter
(2004), goods designated for trade are no longer subject to appropriation. Thus, the
consumables consist of the imported and appropriated fractions of the foreign good,
and the successfully defended domestic non–exported goods. We would also like to
examine the case where both consumption goods are vital to the agents. A quasi–
linear utility function is assumed where both agents derive positive and decreasing
marginal utility from both consumption goods. An exogenous parameter reflects
the relative preference for both agents towards the consumption good in which they
have initial claims to property.6 Given these assumptions and the structure of the
game, we find that, in equilibrium, two different regimes emerge, depending on the
exogenous preference and appropriation effectiveness parameters:
6This means that both agents equally prefer the domestic good and equally prefer the foreign good,
which defines a proper subset of the preferences suggested by Hausken (2004).
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1. Peaceful coexistence: If the effectiveness of time allocated for appropriation
- relative to the time allocated for defensive fortification - is sufficiently low,
deterrence will result. Both agents invest no resource in appropriating the ini-
tial claims of others, and property rights are perfectly secure, a situation that
never occurs in Rider (1999). Moreover, both agents trade goods efficiently.
Since both consumption goods are vital to the agents, inefficiency arises caused
by the investment necessary to deter the appropriation of non-exported goods.
This finding emerges, in contrast to Hausken (2004), although appropriation
is not destructive.
2. Trade and Appropriation: For higher relative effectiveness of appropriation,
we observe the emergence of appropriation. Since the relative effectiveness of
appropriation is heightened, the marginal benefit of challenging initial claims
increases, thus encouraging agents to invest in appropriation. Trade of goods
still exists, but the incentives to trade are violated: Both agents export a
smaller amount than the amount they would export in a standard Walrasian
economy.
The paper will proceed in the following manner: first, we will present the second–
stage and the first–stage optimization problem of the two agents. Second, we will
present the emerging equilibriums of the full game and the corresponding welfare
aspects. Third, we will conclude.
2 Assumptions
Suppose that two agents derive utility from two divisible and contestable consump-
tion goods and one non–appropriable resource, e.g. time. cji defines agent i’s con-
sumption of the jth consumption good, with i, j = 1, 2. Each agent is endowed with
Z units of one consumption good, i.e. agent i has initial nonoverlapping claims to
Z units of the ith consumption good (Z i). Moreover, each agent is endowed with L
units of the resource. The vector of initial endowments is therefore ω = (ω1,ω2),
with
ω1 =
 Z10
L
 , ω2 =
 0Z2
L
 . (1)
Due to the initial endowments, if trade occurs, agent 1 will export good 1 while agent
2 will export good 2.7 We will denote the amount of non–exported goods of agent i
by zi. Thus, Z
i−zi represents the exports of agent i. We assume that traded goods
are unappropriable, which means that once agent i exports the amount Z i − zi, it
is technologically impossible for him to regain these exports. Consequently, if trade
occurs, all non–exported goods are subject to appropriation. If trade does not occur,
7For convenience we will talk about exports (imports) if the excess demand of agent i with regard
to consumption good i is negative (if the excess demand of agent i with regard to the consumption
good j is positive), with i 6= j. Moreover, we will talk about the domestic (foreign) good of agent
i with regard to the ith consumption good (the jth consumption good), although this model does
not necessarily apply to trade between states.
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the whole initial endowment is challengeable.
The resource (L) can be allocated for defensive fortification (di) in order to defend
all non-exported units of the initial claim, or it can be used for offensive weapons
(ai) in order to appropriate. Finally it can be used for leisure (li).
L ≡ ai + di + li. (2)
We assume that L > ai + di, which means that we allow L to be sufficiently large
so that corner solutions can be ruled out.
The fraction of the non–exported endowment of good i that agent i can successfully
defend is represented by the Grossman modification of the Tullock CSF:
F ii (di, aj , θ) =
{
1, for aj = 0,
di
di+θaj
, else,
(3)
with i 6= j.8 F ii (di, aj, θ) is a function of the efforts of agents, raised in order to defend
(di) and to appropriate (aj) the initial claims of agent i. The exogenous parameter
θ, with θ ∈ [0, 1], measures the effectiveness of time allocated for appropriation of
initial claims, relative to time invested into defending initial claims.9 For θ equal
to zero, challenging initial claims is impossible. In this case F ii = 1, irrespective
of the investment in appropriation, which represents one assumption in a standard
Walrasian economy: perfectly secure and costlessly enforced property rights. For
θ ∈]0, 1[, appropriation is no longer precluded but still inferior to defense, in terms
of effectiveness. θ = 1 represents a challenge technology that does not discriminate
between protecting and seizing: No advantage emanates from the initial claims to a
consumption good.10 In order for F ii to be well defined, we assume that the defended
fraction is 1 if agent j allocates no resources for appropriation.
To get a simple function of the challenged fraction of a consumption good, we define:
F ji (dj, ai, θ) = 1− F jj (dj, ai, θ) =
{
0, for ai = 0,
θai
dj+θ ai
, else.
(4)
That is, F ji represents the fraction that agent i can successfully appropriate of the
consumption good j.11
In line with the literature on emerging property rights (see e.g. Grossman (2001)),
the formal design allows us to distinguish between two different levels of property
rights:
8See Tullock (1980) and Grossman and Kim (1995). Subscripts represent agents, while superscripts
represent goods.
9It may represent formal property rights or it may reflect some technological gap between appro-
priating and defending initial claims. See Grossman (2001).
10The restriction of θ for being, at most, equal to 1 is to exclude the possibility of giving away
one’s own endowment in order to retain, ceteris paribus, the same amount at lower costs.
11Since only agent j has initial claims to consumption good j and exports are non–appropriable,
this is equivalent to the statement that F ji (dj , ai) is the fraction that agent i can successfully
appropriate from agent j.
4
Definition 1
(Level of security of property rights)
1. Property rights of agent i are said to be insecure, for F ii < 1 in equilibrium.
2. Property rights of agent i are said to be perfectly secure, if F ii = 1 in
equilibrium.
This means that the degree of security of claims to property is defined by the fraction
of the initial–endowment good that each agent can successfully defend.
As has been mentioned above, both agents derive utility from the two consumption
goods and leisure (ui(c
i
i, c
j
i , li)). We assume that preferences are homothetic with
regard to both consumption goods, and that each agent derives positive and non–
increasing utility from both consumption goods and leisure.
Given the assumption that traded goods are not subject to appropriation, we define:
cii(di, aj , zi) = F
i
i (di, aj) zi, (5)
cji (dj, ai, zj, z˜j) = F
j
i (dj , ai)zj + z˜i. (6)
Equation (5) represents the consumption of the domestic good of agent i. It consists
of the successfully defended fraction of the domestic good that agent i does not ex-
port. Equation (6) represents the amount of the jth good that agent i can consume.
It consists of two parts, first part being the fraction of the unexported amount of
the initial–endowment–good of agent j, that agent i appropriates (F ji (dj, ai)zj), and
second part being the unappropriable imports of agent i (z˜i).
If we include the budget constraint of each agent, we can see that
z˜i =
(Z i − zi)pi
pj
, (7)
that is, the imports of agent i have to equal the exports of agent i evaluated by p
i
pj
in equilibrium.
Again, both agents act in a two–stage game: In the first stage, agents decide inde-
pendently and simultaneously on the level of defense (di). In the second stage, both
agents decide independently and simultaneously on the level of appropriation (ai)
and on the amount of exported goods (Z i − zi).
3 Appropriation and Trade
Given the level of defense of the first stage (d1, d2), each agent maximizes his utility
in the second stage under certain constraints:
max
ai,zi
ui
(
cii, c
j
i , li
)
s.t. ai ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0, Z i − zi ≥ 0.
(8)
The Lagrangian is
Li =ui
(
cii, c
j
i , li
)
+ κi ai + λi zi + µi(Z
i − zi), (9)
5
with κi, λi and µi representing the shadow prices for violating the non–negativity
constraints.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) are:
∂ui(·)
∂cji
∂F ji (·)
∂ai
zj − ∂ui(·)
∂li
+ κi = 0, (10)
κi = 0 =⇒
∂ui
∂li
∂ui
∂cij
=
∂F ji (·)
∂ai
zj , (10
′)
∂ui(·)
∂cii
F ii (·)−
∂ui(·)
∂cji
pi
pj
+ λi − µi = 0, (11)
λi = µi = 0 =⇒
∂ui
∂cii
∂ui
∂c
j
i
=
pi
pj F ii (·)
. (11′)
These partial derivatives capture the key tradeoff for both agents. The first term on
the left hand side (LHS) of equation (10) represents the gain in utility triggered by
a marginal increase in appropriation, where ∂F ji (·)/∂ai× zj represents the marginal
revenue of appropriation to agent i. The second term represents the loss in utility
through a marginal increase in appropriation caused by the leisure time foregone.
The last term on the LHS of (10) shows the positive shadow price for violating the
non–negativity constraint on ai.
Equation (10′) shows the FOCs for κi = 0, i.e. if the restriction ai ≥ 0 is not
binding. Then, in optimum, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the
consumption of the foreign good and leisure (LHS of (10′)) equals the marginal
revenue from appropriation (right hand side (RHS) of (10′)).
The first term on the LHS of (11) represents the gain due to a marginal increase
of zi. Since only the successfully defended fraction of zi is consumable for agent i,
the marginal utility in the domestic consumption good is weighed by the defended
fraction (F ii (·)). The second term represents the marginal loss in utility due to the
reduced exports (Z i−zi), weighed by the terms–of–trade ( pipj ). The third and fourth
term on the LHS of (11) show the shadow–prices for violating the non–negativity
constraints zi ≥ 0 and Z i − zi ≥ 0.
Equation (11′) represents the FOCs for λi = µi = 0, i.e. if the restriction zi ∈ [0, Z i]
is not binding. The LHS of (11′) represents the MRS between both consumption
goods, the RHS shows the relative price in optimum, which is the quotient of the
price of the foreign good (pj) and the effective price of the domestic good ( p
i
F ii (·)
).12
As has already been mentioned, we are especially interested in analyzing the effects
of the assumptions on an economy where both consumption goods are vital to the
agents. Therefore, agents are forced to either participate in barter exchange, to
appropriate, or both. The supposed utility function is assumed to satisfy the Inada-
conditions:
∂ ui(·)
∂cji
∣∣∣∣∣
c
j
i→0
→∞. (12)
12For F ii = 1, the marginal rate of substitution between both consumption goods equals the equi-
librium terms–of–trade. For F ii < 1, it exceeds the equilibrium terms–of–trade, which captures
the increased scarcity of the domestic good to agent i because the insecure property rights.
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For tractability, the utility function is assumed to take the following form:
ui(c
i
i, c
j
i , li) = α ln
[
cii
]
+ (1− α) ln
[
cji
]
+ li, (13)
with α ∈ ]0, αˆ[, αˆ = 2
2
and li = L− ai − di.13
We assume that the amount of the initial–endowment good is identical, that is
Z1 = Z2 = Z. Furthermore, we set p1 = 1 and p2 = p. At first we will take a look
at the Nash-equilibria in the second stage, if the restrictions on ai (ai ≥ 0) and zi
(zi ∈ [0, Z]) are not binding, which we will call from now on the interior solution.
3.1 Interior solution
Given that κi = λi = µi = 0 in equilibrium, we get the following values:
ai(di, dj) =
(−2 + α) dj − α
√
di dj +
√
α dj
√
α
(√
di −
√
dj
)2
+ 4θ
2 θ
, (14a)
F ii (di, dj) =
2di
α
(
di −
√
di dj
)
+
√
α di
(
α(di − dj)2 + 4 θ
) , (14b)
zi(di, dj) =
(− 1 + αF jj (di, dj))αZ
−1 + α− α2 F ji (di, dj)F ii (di, dj)
, (14c)
p (d1, d2) =
−1 + α− α2 F 22 (d2, d1)F 12 (d1, d2)
−1 + α− α2 F 11 (d1, d2)F 21 (d2, d1)
, (14d)
with i 6= j for di, dj > 0.14
To illustrate the exchange of goods for an interior solution in the second stage, we
take a look at figure 1, which represents the consumption space by the use of an
Edgeworth-Bowley box. We assume α < 1
2
and d1 = d2 > 0. Given that both agents
invest no time in appropriation (a1 = a2 = 0), property rights are perfectly secure.
Hence, the offer–curve, which represents the set of foreign goods being demanded as
the relative price varies, takes the typical form for Cobb–Douglas preferences (O˜Ci
for agent i).15 Thus, the intersection of O˜C1 and O˜C2 (point C), which graphically
represents the equilibrium with regard to the traded consumption goods, lies on the
contract curve (CC).
Given a strictly positive and identical investment in appropriation (a1 = a2 > 0),
the offer–curve changes (OCi for agent i). Since in this situation F
1
1 = F
2
2 < 1,
the effective price of the domestic good rises (see (11′)). Hence, the incentives to
trade are reshaped. Taking into account that property rights are insecure, each
agent’s amount of exported goods declines for every possible value of the terms-
of-trade, compared to the first scenario.16 Thus, the equilibrium value of exports
13The reason for the upper boundary of α is that for α > αˆ, the possibility of market breakdown
emerges in equilibrium. This yields enormous analytical problems, however does not alter the
main findings of the model.
14All calculations can be found in the appendix which will be sent to the reader upon request.
15This form of the offer–curve only emerges, if – as assumed – each agent only posses one of the
consumption goods.
16Note that OC1 never intersects O˜C1, i.e., it always lies to the right of OC1. The same applies
to OC2: It never intersects O˜C2.
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Z − z∗
1F¯ 12 z
∗
1
z∗1F¯
1
1
z∗
1 c
1
1
∗
c12
c21
c22
Z − z∗
2
z∗
2
F¯ 21 z
∗
2αZ
F¯ 2
2
z∗
2
O˜C1
O˜C2
u∗1
u∗
2
OC1
OC2
αZ
c21
c2
1
∗
c1
2
∗
c22
∗
CC
B
A
C
Figure 1: Determining the equilibrium level of exports (Z − z∗i ) in the case of an
interior solution in the second stage.
(Z − z∗1 and Z − z∗2 , Point A in figure 1) declines. Given these exports, agent 1
appropriates the fraction F 21 of the non–exported goods of agent 2 (z
∗
2), and agent
2 appropriates the fraction F 12 of the non–exported good of agent 1 (z
∗
1). Thus, the
equilibrium value of the consumption of the foreign good is the sum of imported and
appropriated goods for both agents (c21
∗
and c12
∗
). The consumption of the domestic
good in equilibrium equals the successfully defended fraction of the unexported
goods (c11
∗
and c22
∗
). This determines the equilibrium level of consumption, which
is graphically represented by Point B. Since property rights are insecure, the MRS
of agent 1 and 2 with regard to the consumption goods are unequal in equilibrium:
MRS1(c
2∗
1 , c
1∗
1 ) > MRS2(c
2∗
2 , c
1∗
2 ), thus representing the fact that not all gains from
trade are exhausted due to the insecure property rights.
3.2 First corner solution
In the first corner solution, both individuals invest no time in appropriation (ai = 0)
and the restriction zi ∈ [0, Z] is not binding.
ai = 0, (15a)
F ii = 1, (15b)
zi = αZ, (15c)
p = 1, (15d)
8
for di ≥ α θ. That is, a corner solution concerning the level of appropriation is only
consistent with an export level of (1− α)Z and a level of defense in the first stage
of at least α θ. In this case, property rights are perfectly secure and efficiency arises
with regard to the consumption goods (cf. equation (11′))
Definition 2
(C–efficiency)
An allocation is c-efficient if it is efficient in terms of the consumption goods:
MRS1(c
2
1
∗
, c11
∗
) = MRS2(c
2
2
∗
, c12
∗
).
Thus, in this case, the amount of exported goods is equal to the amount exported in
a standard Walrasian economy. The fact that the equilibrium allocation is not purely
efficient is worth noting. An efficient allocation of goods and resources would imply
c-efficiency and the allocation of no resources among appropriative and defensive
activities.17
3.3 Second corner solution
In the second corner solution, the trade volume drops to zero (zi = Z) and the
restriction ai ≥ 0 is not binding. Thus, the following reaction functions apply:
ai =
−dj +
√
dj
(
dj + 4(1− α) θ
)
2 θ
, (16a)
F ii =
2 di
di +
√
di
(
di + 4(1− α) θ
) , (16b)
zi = Z, (16c)
for di ≤ θ(1−2α)
2
α
and α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
. As we can see, this corner solution only emerges
for a proper subset of α. The intuition behind this finding is the following: If the
relative preference towards the domestic good (α) is strong enough, opportunity
costs of imports of the foreign good are relative high. If, in addition, the level of
defense in the first stage is sufficiently low (di ≤ θ(1−2α)
2
α
), the opportunity costs
of appropriation are lower than the opportunity costs of trade. In this case, barter
exchange will vanish.
The following proposition recapitulates our findings.
Proposition 1
(Barter Exchange and appropriation)
Assuming symmetry with regard to the investment in defense (d1 = d2 = d), we find
that
1. If d1 = d2 ≤ d = θ (1−2α)
2
α
and α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
, barter exchange will collapse (zi =
Z) in equilibrium. Moreover, property rights will become insecure (F ii < 1)
due to the strict positive investment in appropriation (ai > 0).
17Since d ≥ α θ and α ∈]0, αˆ[, this is only possible for θ = 0, that is, if appropriation is technically
impossible.
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2. If d1 = d2 ≥ d¯ = α θ, appropriation will be deterred (ai = 0). Thus, property
rights are perfectly secure (F ii = 1) and barter exchange exhibits c–efficiency,
i.e. MRS1(c
2∗
1 , c
1∗
1 ) =MRS2(c
2∗
2 , c
1∗
2 ).
3. If d1 = d2 ∈
[
d, d¯
]
, neither of the restrictions (zi ∈ [0, Z] and ai ≥ 0) is
binding.
4 Defending
In the first stage, both agents decide simultaneously and independently on the time
they wish to sacrifice for defensive actions (di). At first we would like to examine
the case when the restrictions on ai and zi are not binding (interior solution). Given
the values ai(di, dj), zi(di, dj), F
i
i (di, dj), and p(d1, d2) (equations (14)), the indirect
utility functions yield:
v1(d1, d2) =α ln
[
F 11 (d1, d2) z1(d1, d2)
]
+ (1− α) ln
[
F 21 (d1, d2) z2(d1, d2) +
(Z − z1(d1, d2))
p(d1, d2)
]
+ L− a1(d1, d2)− d1,
(17.1)
and
v2(d2, d1) =α ln
[
F 22 (d1, d2) z2(d1, d2)
]
+ (1− α) ln
[
F 12 (d1, d2) z1(d1, d2) +
(
Z − z2(d1, d2)
)
p(d1, d2)
]
+ L− a2(d1, d2)− d2.
(17.2)
The aim of each agent is to maximize utility over di:
max
di
vi(di, dj)
s.t. di ≥ 0.
In analyzing the optimal level of defense in stage one, we can make use of the
envelope theorem, which allows us to only consider the effect of a change in di on
the functions that are parameters for agent i.18 We are able to show that both FOCs
are symmetric. Therefore, we know that d1 = d2 = d is a Nash-equilibrium. Hence,
the following FOC has to be satisfied:
H(α, θ, d)
!
= 0, (18)
18This is unprohibited since we assume that the restrictions on zi and ai are not binding.
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with
H(α, θ, d) =
∂vi
∂di
∣∣∣∣∣
di=dj=d
=− 1 +
α
(
2−
√
αd
θ
)
4 d
+
α2
(
1− α +
√
αd
θ
)(
d
(
2− α +
√
α d
θ
)
− 2α
√
α d θ
)
4
(
(1− α)
√
α θ d+ α d
)2
(19)
for d > 0.19 We are able to show, that as long as θ > θ˜ = α
4
, there is a unique
solution to this FOC in terms of d, which we will call dI .
Given the above findings, we are able to draft the following proposition:
Proposition 2
(Defending)
1. If θ ∈ [0, θ¯], both agents will choose the level of defense just sufficient to
deter appropriation (d = d¯), with θ¯ = 1
4
(2 + α− 2α)2.
2. If θ ∈]θ¯, 1], both agents will choose a level of defense (d) which is insuf-
ficient to deter appropriation but which does not foreclose barter exchange
(d = dI ∈]d, d¯[).
3. Given the assumed set of exogenous preferences (α ∈ ]0, αˆ[ and θ ∈ [0, 1]) the
collapse of barter exchange never occurs.
The proof of proposition 2.3 is left to the appendix.
Proof of proposition 2.1. and 2.2.
Since d1 = d2 = d > d in equilibrium the reaction functions of the second stage
yield:
a(d) =
{√
αd θ−d
θ
for d ∈]0, d¯ [,
0 for d ≥ d¯, (20a)
F ii (d) =
{√
d
α θ
for d ∈]0, d¯[,
1 for d ≥ d¯,
(20b)
z(d) =
{
α
√
θZ√
αd+(1−α)
√
θ
for d ∈]0, d¯ [,
α Z for d ≥ d¯,
(20c)
p =1, (20d)
where the upper case is simply a reformulation of the reaction functions in the
interior solution for d1 = d2 = d (cf. equations (14)). The lower case corresponds
19Assuming that both individuals do not invest in defense (d = 0) is never a solution, irrespective
of the level of θ and α. This is due to the fact that the benefit of a marginal increase in d goes
to infinity for d = 0.
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to the reaction functions in the first corner solution (cf. equations (15)), and since
d1 = d2 = d > 0, the terms-of-trade in equilibrium equals one regardless of the level
of d.
Equation (20c) tells us that the exported amount of the initial endowment good is
strictly positive for all d > 0. Moreover, for d ≥ d¯, the exported amount of the
initial endowment good is (1 − α)Z, which is, as we already pointed out earlier,
the level of exports in a standard Walrasian economy. This is due to the fact that
for d ≥ d¯ the level of appropriation is zero for both agents, which induces perfectly
secure property rights (cf. equations (20), lower case). For d < d¯, we observe the
emergence of appropriation and with it insecure property rights, which induces a
decrease in exports (cf. equations (20), upper case).
dI
θ¯
d¯
1
θ
θ˜
Figure 2: d∗(α, θ) contingent on θ.
Consequently, the indirect utility function of agent i in the symmetric case becomes
vi(di) = α ln[αZ] + (1− α) ln[(1− α)Z]− di, (21)
for di ≥ d¯. Hence, vi(di) is a decreasing linear function of di, for di ≥ d¯. Accordingly,
we know that vi(di) either has an interior maximum at a value of di = d
I that satisfies
∂vi
∂di
∣∣∣∣
di=dj=dI
= 0 with dI ∈]0, d¯ ], (22)
or that vi is maximized at a value of di = d¯ that satisfies
∂vi
∂di
∣∣∣∣
di=dj=d¯
≥ 0 with d¯ ≤ dI . (23)
At the border between the interior and corner solution the restriction on a (a ≥ 0) is
non binding (d = dI , cf. equation (22)) and the level of defense is sufficient to deter
appropriation (d = d¯, cf. equation (23)). Thus, implementing d = d¯ in equation
(18) and solving this FOC for θ, delivers the case separating level of the exogenous
effectiveness parameter:
θ¯ =
1
4
(
2 + α− 2α2
)
, (24)
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where it is easy to verify that θ¯ > θ˜, ∀ α ∈]0, αˆ[, i.e., the case separating level of θ
only emerges as long as there exists a solution to equation (18). Moreover, θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]
∀ α ∈]0, αˆ[.
We are able to show that dI ≥ d¯ for θ ∈]θ˜, θ¯] and dI < d¯ for θ ∈]θ¯, 1] (see figure 2).
Thus, as long as θ is sufficiently small (θ ∈]0, θ¯]), i.e. appropriation is sufficiently
relative ineffective compared to defense, agents will implement a level of defense just
sufficient to deter appropriation. For higher values of θ (θ ∈]θ¯, 1]), agents will choose
a level of defense which lies below d¯ and is thus insufficient to deter appropriation.
Thus, conditions 22 and 23 imply that
d ∗(α, θ) =
{
d¯ for θ ∈ ]0, θ¯] ,
dI < d¯ for θ ∈ ]θ¯, 1] , (25)
which is graphically represented in figure 2.
We now turn to display the equilibrium values in the full game.
5 Equilibrium in the full game
Since we detected the emergence of different values of d∗, subject to the exogenous
parameters α and θ in the first stage, we are now able to introduce the optimal level
of a and z in the second stage subject to the mentioned parameters. As discussed,
two different regimes emerge in equilibrium, contingent on the set of exogenous
parameters α and θ:
A = {(α, θ) ∣∣ 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, 0 < α < αˆ} ,
B = {(α, θ) ∣∣ θ¯ < θ ≤ 1, 0 < α < αˆ} .
Thus, we are able to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3
(Efficiency and security of property rights)
1. If (α, θ) ∈ A (first regime) the resulting equilibrium is non-aggressive, i.e.
a∗(α, θ) = 0, which induces perfectly secure property rights (F i
∗
i = 1).
Therefore, the resulting allocation is c-efficient. Inefficiencies arise due to
the strictly positive level of defense, necessary to deter appropriation if θ 6= 0.
2. If (α, θ) ∈ B (second regime) the resulting equilibrium is aggressive, i.e.
a∗(α, θ) > 0, which induces insecure property rights (F i
∗
i < 1). Therefore,
the resulting allocation is c-inefficient: Not all gains from trade are exhausted.
The regime borders are graphically represented in figure 3. Contingent on these
13
BA
θ
1
αˆ
α
Figure 3: Regime–border
parameters, the level z, a, F ii and p result in equilibrium:
d ∗(α, θ) =
{
α θ for (α, θ) ∈ A,
dI for (α, θ) ∈ B, (26a)
a∗(α, θ) =
{
0 for (α, θ) ∈ A,√
αθ dI−dI
θ
for (α, θ) ∈ B, (26b)
F ii
∗
(α, θ) =
{
1 for (α, θ) ∈ A,√
dI
αθ
for (α, θ) ∈ B, (26c)
z∗(α, θ) =
{
αZ for (α, θ) ∈ A,
αZ
√
θ√
αdI+(1−α)
√
θ
for (α, θ) ∈ B, (26d)
p∗ =1 for (α, θ) ∈ A ∪ B. (26e)
Given that (α, θ) ∈ A the first regime emerges, which we introduced as the regime
of peaceful coexistence. Here, appropriation is endogenously deterred (26b) by a
sufficient investment in defensive activities in the first stage (26a), so that property
rights of both agents are perfectly secure (26c). This induces c–efficiency, so that
the endogenously determined market clearing price (26e) equals the marginal rate
of substitution between both consumption goods for both agents in equilibrium.
Both agents, given the initial endowment, export a fraction of (1 − α)Z units of
the domestic good (Z − z∗(α, θ)), which is equivalent to the traded amounts in a
standard Walrasian economy (26d). Hence, all gains from trade are exhausted. It
is worth noting that in this regime the resulting equilibria are not overall efficient,
since there are remaining inefficiencies due to the investment of both agents neces-
sary to deter appropriation, given that θ 6= 0. For θ = 0 the model considered here
maps the standard textbook case of barter exchange. In a well-defined sense, then,
the neoclassical structure is a special counterpart of the model considered here.
For (α, θ) ∈ B, the second regime emerges, trade and appropriation. As has been
said, in this regime the relative ineffectiveness of appropriation (θ > θ¯) is insuffi-
cient to endogenously deter appropriation ((26a) and (26b)), which induces insecure
14
property rights (26c).20 This has an unambiguous effect on trade volume (26d):
Since the effective price of the domestic good is increased through the insecurity of
property rights, both agents are now exporting less than in a standard Walrasian
economy (Z − z∗(α, θ)).21 Thus, the marginal rates of substitution between both
consumption goods are unequal in equilibrium to the market clearing price, which
represents the fact that there are unutilized gains from trade in equilibrium. This
causes additional inefficiencies compared to the first regime: the resulting equilib-
rium is no longer c–efficient.
Thus, we were able to show that even if both consumptions goods are vital to the
agents, non-aggressive equilibria emerge. The reason for this is that trade reduces
the incentives to appropriate, which was our main argument.
6 Welfare aspects
At last, we take a closer look at the welfare aspects. For this, we need to specify
the investment in defensive and appropriative activities in equilibrium. Since we
are not able to explicitly display the level of defense contingent on α and θ in the
second regime (dI(α, θ)) we are forced to simulate dI for various level of α. Given that
α ∈ { 1
10
, 1
5
, 1
4
, 1
3
, 1
2
, 3
5
}
figure 5 - figure 10 on page 18 display the level of appropriation
and defense in equilibrium (a∗(α, θ), d∗(α, θ)) contingent on θ. Moreover we see the
sum of efforts of each agent in equilibrium in the contest (e∗(α, θ)), where
e∗(α, θ) = d∗(α, θ) + a∗(α, θ). (27)
The key feature is now that the sum of efforts in equilibrium tends to rise, as θ
rises. In the first regime (θ ≤ θ¯) the sum of efforts are equal to to the investment
in defense, sufficient to deter appropriation. Therefore, the level of appropriation is
zero. Moreover, as θ rises the investment in defense also rises.22 As θ rises above
θ¯ (second regime) there are two effects on the sum of efforts. First, the level of
defense declines. Second, the level of appropriation rises. The combined effect on
e∗(α, θ), given that α is an element of the above set, is unambiguously positive.
Therefore, e∗(α, θ) is strictly higher in the second regime (θ > θ¯) than in the first
regime (θ ≤ θ¯). Given the results of the former chapter, we are now able to reason
that any equilibrium in the second regime is Pareto-dominated by any equilibrium
in the first regime, given that α is an element of the above set.
This fact is captured in figure 4: The upper curve represents the unconstrained
Pareto payoff frontier, i.e. the one that would arise if claims to property were
costlessly enforced (θ = 0) and efficient exchange could take place. Due to the
symmetry assumptions, the resulting allocation in equilibrium is depicted by point
(W ), which represents an overall efficient allocation, since a∗ = d∗ = 0 and therefore
no leisure time has been sacrificed (l∗i = L) in this case.
Given that θ ∈]0, θ¯] (first regime sans the textbook case (θ = 0)), the payoff frontier
20Since we already found out that dI < d¯ = α θ as long as θ > θ¯, we see that F ii
∗
< 1 in this
regime.
21Again, this result stems from the fact that dI < d¯ = α θ for θ > θ¯. Thus, the denominator of
z∗(α, θ) is always smaller than
√
θ and therefore z∗(α, θ) > αZ in the second regime.
22Recall that in this case d∗(α, θ) = d¯ = α θ
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u∗2
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W
θ = 0
θ ∈]0, θ¯]
θ ∈]θ¯, 1]
u∗1
Figure 4: Pareto frontiers and equilibrium allocations of consumption goods contin-
gent on θ
is shifted inwards. Since in this case the endogenously determined level of d is
strictly positive in equilibrium (d∗(α, θ) = d¯) the resulting level of leisure declines
(l¯∗i = L − e∗(α, θ) = L − d¯), compared to the unconstrained case. The resulting
allocation in equilibrium (point A) is c-efficient, which is represented by the fact
that A lies on the constrained Pareto frontier, but not overall efficient due to the
positive investment in defense.
If θ > θ¯ (second regime), the sum of efforts in the contest is strictly higher than
in the first regime (lˆ∗i = L − e∗(α, θ) = L − (dI +
√
αθ dI−dI
θ
) < l¯∗i ). Thus, the
resulting restricted Pareto frontier in the second regime is represented by the inner
curve. Point B now represents the resulting allocation in equilibrium in the second
regime, which lies off the corresponding Pareto frontier. This captures the fact of
c-inefficiency : Not all gains from trade are exhausted due to the insecure property
rights.
7 Conclusion
The fact that property rights are perfectly secure and costlessly enforced is one
major assumption for the rigorous neoclassical paradigm. From this starting point
it is possible to explain the emergence of mutually advantageous trade. But this
formulation of the economic problem is incomplete, since often property rights are
not well defined or are costly to enforce. If this is true, the question arising is
how the shadow of conflict reshapes the incentives to engage in mutually beneficial
activities (as the trade of goods). Following recent literature we developed a two
agent model which incorporates the potential of conflict in a standard neoclassical
framework. This model emphasized the distinction between offensive weapons being
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the instruments of appropriation, and fortification, which provides defense against
appropriation. The main goal was to show to what extent claims to property are
ex-post secure, that is, after the possible trade of goods has occurred. We have
shown that even in the absence of formal property rights, perfectly secure prop-
erty rights can emerge in equilibrium, though (1) the contestable consumables are
vital to the individuals and (2) initial endowments followed a binary distribution.
The reason for this is that trading not only reduces the stock of goods subject to
appropriation, but also reduces the propensity to engage in appropriation, due to
the mutual beneficial effects of trade itself. In this regime (peaceful coexistence) the
emerging trade of goods exhausts all gains from trade. However, inefficiencies arise
due to the investment in defensive activities to deter appropriation. Thus, we have
found an endogenously determined measure for the transaction costs underlying a
market which replicates the outcome of a Walrasian market (zero appropriation and
efficient exchange).
These findings only apply, if the relative effectiveness of appropriation compared
to defending initial claims is sufficiently small. If appropriation is not sufficiently
ineffective compared to fortification, trade and appropriation emerges in equilibrium
(second regime). Since claims to property are not fully secure incentives to trade
are violated. This has an unambiguously effect on the trade volume - it declines. In
this regime there are unutilized gains from trade in equilibrium.
Moreover, we were able to show that every equilibrium in the first regime strictly
Pareto-dominates every equilibrium in the second regime. This is due to two facts:
First, the first regime, unlike the second regime, exhibits c-efficiency. Secondly, the
efforts in the contest, i.e. the sum of investments in defensive and appropriative
activities, is strictly higher in the second regime.
Summing things up, we showed that in contrast to the aforementioned literature,
efficient market-based exchange of goods is possible, although property rights are
not exogenuously and costlessly enforced, although appropriation is not destructive
and although the circumstances (preferences and initial endowments) are awkward.
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Simulation
The value of appropriation (a∗(α, θ)), defense (d∗(α, θ)) and the sum of efforts
(e∗(α, θ)) in equilibrium contingent on θ for various levels of α.
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Appendix (not for publication)
A Stage 2
The utility maximizing problem for agent i in stage 2 becomes:
max
ai,zi
ui(c
i
i, c
j
i , li)
s.t. ai ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0, zi ≤ Z i
The Lagrangian becomes:
Li(ai, zi) = ui(c
i
i, c
j
i , li) + µi (Z
i − zi).
Partial derivation leads to
∂Li
∂ai
≤ 0, ai ≥ 0 and ∂Li
∂ai
ai = 0,
∂Li
∂zi
≤ 0, zi ≥ 0 and ∂Li
∂zi
zi = 0,
∂Li
∂µi
≥ 0, µi ≥ 0 and ∂Li
∂µi
µi = 0,
where each third term represents the complementary slackness condition.
Given the quasi–linear preferences (equation 13, page 7), the utility function for
agent 1 becomes:
u1 =α ln
[
F 11 (d1, a2, θ) z1
]
+ (1− α) ln
[
F 21 (d2, a1, θ) z2 +
(Z1 − z1)p1
p2
]
+ L− a1 − d1,
(28.1)
and for agent 2:
u2 =α ln
[
F 22 (d2, a1, θ) z2
]
+ (1− α) ln
[
F 12 (d1, a2, θ) z1 +
(Z2 − z2)p2
p1
]
+ L− a2 − d2,
(28.2)
where (28.i) represents a function of the ith agent.
Implementing κi and λi as shadow price for violating the non-negativity constraints
on ai and zi, respectively, we acquire the following modified Lagrangian:
L1(a1, z1) = u1 + κ1 a1 + λ1 z1 + µ1(Z − z1) (29.1)
and
L2(a2, z2) = u2 + κ2 a2 + λ2 z2 + µ2(Z − z2). (29.2)
Given this functional specification the FOCs (equation 10 and 11, page 6) yield:
∂L1
∂a1
=
(1− α) d2 z2 p2 θ
(d2 + a1θ)
(
p1(d2 + a1 θ)(Z1 − z1) + a1 θ z2 p2
) − 1 + κ1 != 0, (30.1)
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∂L2
∂a2
=
(1− α) d1 z1 p1 θ
(d1 + a2 θ)
(
p2(d1 + a2 θ )(Z2 − z2) + a2 θ z1 p1
) − 1 + κ2 != 0, (30.2)
∂L1
∂z1
=
α
z1
− (1− α) (a1 θ + d2)p
1
a1 θ z2 p2 + (Z1 − z1) (a1θ + d2)p1 + λ1 − µ1
!
= 0, (31.1)
∂L2
∂z2
=
α
z2
− (1− α) (a2 θ + d1) p
2
a2 θ z1 p1 + (Z2 − z2) (a2θ + d1)p2 + λ2 − µ2
!
= 0. (31.2)
Setting Z1 = Z2 = Z, p1 = 1 and p2 = 2, we are now able to distinguish between
the following six cases (since zi = 0 and Z − zi = 0 can not emerge simultaneously,
there are only six, rather than eight possible cases).
Case ai κi zi λi Z − zi µi
1. ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0
2. = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0
3. ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0
4. = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0
5. ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0
6. = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0
A.1 First case: Interior solution
Given that none of the restrictions are binding in equilibrium, it follows that
ai ≥ 0 =⇒ κi = 0,
zi ≥ 0 =⇒ λi = 0,
Z − zi ≥ 0 =⇒ µi = 0.
Therefore the following reaction–functions result:
z1(z2, d2, p, a1) = α
(
Z + F 21 (d2, a1) p z2
)
, (32.1)
z2(z1, d1, p, a2) = α
(
Z +
F 12 (d1, a2)z1
p
)
. (32.2)
In order to determine the equilibrium values, we have to solve the partial derivations
(equations 30 and 31) simultaneously while taking into account, that in equilibrium,
Z − z1(d2, a1, p, z2)
p
!
= Z − z2(d1, a2, p, z1). (33)
This delivers the following equilibrium values:
ai(di, dj) =
(−2 + α) dj − α
√
di dj +
√
α dj
√
α
(√
di −
√
dj
)2
+ 4θ
2 θ
, (34a)
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F ii (di, dj) =
2di
α(di −
√
di dj) +
√
α di (α(di − dj)2 + 4 θ)
, (34b)
zi(di, dj) =
(− 1 + αF jj (di, dj))αZ
−1 + α− α2 F ji (di, dj)F ii (di, dj)
, (34c)
p (d1, d2) =
−1 + α− α2 F 22 (d2, d1)F 12 (d1, d2)
−1 + α− α2 F 11 (d1, d2)F 21 (d2, d1)
, (34d)
for di, dj > 0, with i 6= j.
A.2 Second case: First corner solution
In the first corner solution, both individuals invest no time in appropriation (ai = 0)
and the restriction on zi (zi ∈ [0, Z]) is not binding:
ai = 0 =⇒ κi ≥ 0,
zi ≥ 0 =⇒ λi = 0,
Z ≥ zi =⇒ µi = 0,
The first order conditions thus become:
(1− α) z2 d2 p θ
d22 (Z − z1)
− 1 + κ1 != 0, (35.1)
(1− α) d1 θ z1
d21 p (Z − z2)
− 1 + κ2 != 0, (35.2)
α
z1
− 1− a
Z − z1
!
= 0, (36.1)
α
z2
− 1− α
Z − z2
!
= 0. (36.2)
Solving equations 36 while taking into account, that
Z − z1
p
!
= Z − z2 (37)
in equilibrium, delivers z1 = αZ, z2 = αZ and p = 1. Applying these values into
equations 35 delivers
κ1 = 1− α θ
d2
, (38.1)
κ2 = 1− α θ
d1
. (38.2)
Since we know that in the corner solution κi ≥ 0 this delivers:
di ≥ α θ (39)
in a corner solution. Summing up, we find that:
ai = 0, (40a)
F ii = 1, (40b)
zi = αZ, (40c)
p = 1, (40d)
for di ≥ α θ.
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A.3 Third case: Second corner solution
In the third case zi = Z and the restriction on ai (ai ≥ 0) is not binding.
ai ≥ 0 =⇒ κi = 0,
zi ≥ 0 =⇒ λi = 0,
zi = Z =⇒ µi ≥ 0.
The FOCs thus become:
(1− α) d2
a1(d2 + a1 θ)
− 1 != 0, (41.1)
(1− α) d1
a2(d1 + a2 θ)
− 1 != 0, (41.2)
−µ1 + α
Z
− (1− α)(d1 + a2 θ)
a2 θ Z
!
= 0, (42.1)
−µ2 + α
Z
− (1− α)(d2 + a1 θ)
a1 θ Z
!
= 0, (42.2)
Solving equations 41 for a1 and a2, respectively delivers:
a1 =
−d2 +
√
d2(d2 + 4(1− α) θ)
2 θ
(43.1)
a2 =
−d1 +
√
d1(d1 + 4(1− α) θ)
2 θ
(43.2)
Implementing equations 43 into equations 42 and solving for the shadow prices,
delivers
µ1 = −
d2 + (2− 4α) θ +
√
d2
(
d2 + 4 θ(1− α)
)
2 θ Z
, (44.1)
µ2 = −
d1 + (2− 4α) θ +
√
d1
(
d1 + 4 θ(1− α)
)
2 θ Z
. (44.2)
Since we know that in this corner solution µi ≥ 0, we find that the following condi-
tions have to be satisfied
dj ≤ (1− 2α)
2 θ
α
∧ α ∈
]
1
2
, αˆ
[
. (45)
Summing up, in the second corner solution, we find in equilibrium that
ai =
−dj +
√
dj(dj + 4(1− α) θ)
2θ
, (46a)
F ii =
2 di
di +
√
di
(
di + 4(1− α) θ
) , (46b)
zi = Z, (46c)
for dj ≤ (1−2α)
2 θ
α
and α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
.
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A.4 Forth case: Third corner solution
In the forth case ai = 0 and zi = Z:
ai = 0 =⇒ κi ≥ 0,
zi ≥ 0 =⇒ λi = 0,
zi = Z =⇒ µi ≥ 0.
In this case the denominator of the fraction in equations 30 will go to zero, thus
the value of these equations will go to infinity. Since neither consumption goods are
traded (zi = Z), nor appropriated (ai = 0), the equilibrium consumption would for
each agent consist of none foreign goods. Since, ∂ ui(·)
∂c
j
i
∣∣∣
c
j
i→0
→∞. (see equation (12),
page 6), this is no equilibrium.
A.5 Fifth case
In the fifth case zi = 0 and the restriction on ai (ai ≥ 0) is not binding.
ai ≥ 0 =⇒ κi = 0,
zi = 0 =⇒ λi ≥ 0,
Z ≥ 0 =⇒ µi ≥ 0.
In this case the values of equations 31 will go to infinity, i.e. zi = 0 is never an
equilibrium.
A.6 Sixth case
In the sixth case zi = 0 and ai = 0.
ai = 0 =⇒ κi ≥ 0,
zi = 0 =⇒ λi ≥ 0,
Z ≥ zi =⇒ µi ≥ 0.
Again, this case needs no further consideration, since zi = 0 never can emerge in
equilibrium.
B Offer–curve, for F ii ∈ [0, 1]
For the following explanation we set i 6= j. Given an appointed and identical
investment in appropriation (ai) and defense (di) for both agents, it follows an
appointed and identical defended fraction (F ii ) for both agents. If we denote the
amount of non–exported goods of agent j with zj , the amount of non–exported
goods of agent i with zi and the amount of imported goods of agent i with z˜i, we
get the following utility function:
ui = α ln[F
i
i zi] + (1− α) ln[F ji zj + z˜i] + L− ai − di, (47)
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with i 6= j. The budget constraint is then
pi Z i − pizi − pj z˜i. ≥ 0. (48)
If each agent maximizes his utility by choosing zi and z˜i under given restrictions
max
zi,z˜i
α ln[F ii zi] + (1− α) ln[F ji zj + z˜i] + L− ai − di (49)
s.t. pi Z i − pizi − pj z˜i ≥ 0, (50)
we get the following Marshallian demand functions
zi(p
i, pj) = αZ i +
αF ji p
j zj
pi
, (51)
z˜i(p
i, pj) =
(1− α)Z i pi
pj
− αF ji zj , (52)
where zi(p
i, pj) represents the demand for the domestic consumption good and
z˜i(p
i, pj) represents the demand for the foreign good. For F ji = 0 (perfectly secure
property rights) these Marshallian functions equal the one in a standard Walrasian
economy.
In equilibrium the non-exported goods of agent j (zj) have to equal the initial–
endowment of agent j (Zj) minus the demand for foreign goods of agent i, that
is
zj = Z
j − z˜i. (53)
Thus, the equilibrium value of the Marshallian demand functions become:
z∗i (p
i, pj) =
αZ ipi + αF ji (p
j Zj − pi Z i)
pi(1− αF ji )
, (54)
z˜∗i (p
i, pj) =
(1− a) pi Z i − αF ji pj Zj
pj(1− αF ji )
. (55)
If we set pi = 1 we can now determine the offer–curve for agent i:
OCi(z˜i) =
αZ i(F jj z˜i + F
j
i Z
j)
z˜i + αF
j
i (Z
j − z˜i)
, (56)
which is a continuous, declining and convex function of z˜i, for z˜i ∈ [0, Zj], α ∈]0, αˆ[
and F ii ∈ [0, 1[:
∂OCi
∂z˜i
= − (1− α)αF
j
i Z
iZj
(αF ji (Z
j − z˜i) + z˜i)2
< 0, (57)
∂2OCi
∂z˜2i
=
2(1− α)αF ji (1− αF ji )Z iZj
(αF ji (Z
j − z˜i) + z˜i)3
> 0. (58)
For F ii (·) = 1 the offer-curve takes the typical form:
OCi = αZ
i. (59)
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C The FOCs in the first stage
The utility maximizing problem for agent i in stage 1 becomes:
max
di
vi(di, dj)
s.t. di ≥ 0.
Assuming that the restriction on ai and zi is not binding, the Lagrangian becomes
Li = vi(di, dj) + ηi di, (60)
where ηi represents the shadow price for violating the non-negativity constraint on
di and vi(di, dj) is represented by (17.1) for agent 1 and (17.2) for agent 2 (page
10). Using the envelope theorem and assuming that ηi = 0, this yields the following
FOCs:
α
F 11 (d1, d2)
a2(d1, d2)− d1θ ∂a2(d1,d2)∂d1(
θa2(d1, d2) + d1
)2
+
(1− α)
F 21 (d1, d2) z2(d1, d2) +
Z − z1(d1, d2)
p(d1, d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ1F 21 (d1, d2) ∂z2(d1, d2)∂d1 −Z − z1(d1, d2)(p(d1, d2))2 ∂p(d1, d2)∂d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ1
− 1 != 0,
(61.1)
and for agent 2:
α
F 22 (d1, d2)
a1(d1, d2)− d2θ ∂a1(d1,d2)∂d2(
θ a1(d1, d2) + d2
)2
+
(1− α)
F 12 (d1, d2) z1(d1, d2) +
(
Z − z2(d1, d2)
)
p (d1, d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ2F 12 (d1, d2) ∂z1(d1, d2)∂d2 + (Z − z2(d1, d2)) ∂p(d1, d2)∂d2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ2
− 1 != 0.
(61.2)
It is obvious that – except for terms Φi and Ψi – the FOCs are symmetric for both
agents. We can proof that even these two terms are symmetric:
At first we will show that Φ1 is symmetric to Φ2. Given the equilibrium values out
of the second stage, the value of imports is for agent 1
Φ1 =
Z − z1(d1, d2)
p(d1, d2)
⇐⇒ Φ1 =(2α− 1)Z − α
2Z(F 21 F
1
1 + F
2
2 )
−1 + α− α2 F 22 F 12
(62)
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and for agent 2
Φ2 =
Z − z2(d2, d1)
p(d2, d1)
⇐⇒ Φ2 =(2α− 1)Z − α
2 Z(F 12 F
2
2 + F
1
1 )
−1 + α− α2 F 11 F 21
.
(63)
As we can now easily see, Φ1 is symmetric to Φ2.
Next we proof that Ψ1 is symmetric to Ψ2:
Ψ1 = −Z − z1(d1, d2)(
p(·))2 ∂p(·)∂d1 , (64)
Ψ2 =
(
Z − z2(d1, d2)
) ∂p(·)
∂d2
. (65)
The partial derivation of p(d1, d2) subject to d1 is:
∂p(·)
∂d1
=
(
− α2
(
∂F 22
∂a1
∂a1
∂d1
F 12 + F
2
2
(
∂F 12
∂d1
+
∂F 12
∂a2
∂a2
∂d1
))
(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)
+ α2
((
∂F 11
∂d1
+
∂F 11
∂a2
∂a2
∂d1
)
F 21 + F
1
1
∂F 21
∂a1
∂a1
∂d1
)
(
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
))/(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)2
(64a)
and
−Z − z1(·)(
p(·))2 = −
(
α2 F 21 F
1
2 − (1− α)2
)
Z
−1 + α− α2F 21F 11
(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)2
(
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
)2 . (64b)
So that
Ψ1 =
(
α2F 21F
1
2 − (1− a)2
)
Z(
α2
(
∂F 22
∂a1
∂a1
∂d1
F 12 + F
2
2
(
∂F 12
∂d1
+
∂F 12
∂a2
∂a2
∂d1
))(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)
− α2
((
∂F 11
∂d1
+
∂F 11
∂a2
∂a2
∂d1
)
F 21 + F
1
1
∂F 21
∂a1
∂a1
∂d1
)(
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
))
/((
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
)2(
− 1 + α− α2F 21F 11
))
.
(64’)
The partial derivation of p(d1, d2) subject to d2 is
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∂p(·)
∂d2
=
(
− α2
((
∂F 22
∂d2
+
∂F 22
∂a1
∂a1
∂d2
)
F 12 + F
2
2
∂F 12
∂a2
∂a2
∂d2
)
(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)
+ α2
(
∂F 11
∂a2
∂a2
∂d2
F 21 + F
1
1
(
∂F 21
∂d2
+
∂F 21
∂a1
∂a1
∂d2
))
(
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
))/(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)2
(65a)
and
Z − z2(·) =
(
α2 F 12 F
2
1 − (1− α)2
)
Z
−1 + α− α2F 12F 22
. (65b)
That is
Ψ2 =
(
α2 F 12 F
2
1 − (1− α)2
)
Z(
α2
(
∂F 11
∂a2
∂a2
∂d2
F 21 + F
1
1
(
∂F 21
∂d2
+
∂F 21
∂a1
∂a1
∂d2
))(
− 1 + α− α2F 22F 12
)
− α2
((
∂F 22
∂d2
+
∂F 22
∂a1
∂a1
∂d2
)
F 12 + F
2
2
∂F 12
∂a2
∂a2
∂d2
)(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
))
/(
− 1 + α− α2F 11F 21
)2(
− 1 + α− α2F 12F 22
)
.
(65’)
Thus, we see that both terms are symmetric. That is,
Ψi =
(
α2F ji F
i
j − (1− a)2
)
Z(
α2
(
∂F jj
∂ai
∂ai
∂di
F ij + F
j
j
(
∂F ij
∂di
+
∂F ij
∂aj
∂aj
∂di
))(
− 1 + α− α2F iiF ji
)
− α2
((
∂F ii
∂di
+
∂F ii
∂aj
∂aj
∂di
)
F ji + F
i
i
∂F ji
∂ai
∂ai
∂di
)(
− 1 + α− α2F jj F ij
))
/((
− 1 + α− α2F jj F ij
)2(
− 1 + α− α2F ji F ii
))
,
(66)
with i 6= j.
Since we know that the FOCs of both agents in the first stage are symmetric, we
know that d1 = d2 = d is a Nash-equilibrium. Without loss of generality we will take
a look at the solution of equation (61.1), i.e. the solution to the FOC in stage one
for agent 1, under the assumption that d1 = d2 = d. Using this symmetry property
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we find that
a(d) = ai(di, dj)
∣∣∣
di=dj=d
=
√
α θ d− d
θ
, (67a)
F ii (d) = F
i
i (dj, dj)
∣∣∣
di=dj=d
=
√
d
α θ
, (67b)
z(d) = zi(di, dj)
∣∣∣
di=dj=d
=
α
√
θZ√
α d+ (1− α)
√
θ
, (67c)
p = p(d1, d2)
∣∣∣
d1=d2=d
= 1, (67d)
which correspond to equations (20) on page 11. Thus, the FOC in the first stage
(equation (61.1)) yields in the symmetric case:
α θ
F 11 (d)
a(d)− ∂a2∂d1
∣∣∣
d1=d2=d
(d1 + θ a2)2
 + 1− α
Z − F 11 (d) z(d)
((
1− F 11 (d)
) ∂z2
∂d1
∣∣∣
d1=d2=d
−(Z − z(d)) ∂p(d1, d2)
∂d1
∣∣∣
d1=d2=d
)
= 0,
which, after some tedious algebra, leads to
H(α, θ, d) =− 1 +
α
(
2−
√
α d
θ
)
4 d
+
α2
(
1− α +
√
αd
θ
)(
d
(
2− α +
√
αd
θ
)
− 2α
√
α d θ
)
4
(
(1− α)
√
α θ d+ α d
)2 = 0,
(68)
which corresponds to equation (18) on page 10. We will call the value of d that
satisfies equation (68) dI(α, θ).
D Existence and uniqueness of dI(α, θ)
Turning to the properties of H(α, θ, d) we find that
lim
d→0
H(α, θ, d)→∞, (69)
i.e., d = 0 could never be a solution for the FOC.
Partial derivation of H(α, θ, d) subject to d leads (after some tedious algebra) to
∂H(α, θ, d)
∂d
=
(1− α)α3Θ
8
√
α θ d(α d+ (1− α)
√
α θ d)3
, (70)
with
Θ =− α d2 + (1− α) θ
(
−4 θ(1− α)− (11− α)
√
α θ d
)
− d
(
(1− α)
√
α θ d+ 3α θ(3− α)
)
.
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α
4 θ
− 1
dI(α, θ)
d
H(α, d, θ)
Figure 11: H(α, d, θ) contingent on d for θ > θ˜
Since Θ is unambiguously negative for d > 0, ∂H(α,θ,d)
∂d
is unambiguously negative.
Thus, H(α, θ, d) is a strictly monotonous decreasing and continuous function of d,
∀ d > 0.23 Moreover, we find that
lim
d→∞
H(α, θ, d) = −1 + α
4 θ
. (71)
Thus, since H(α, θ, d) is a strictly monotonous decreasing and continuous function,
there exists a unique solution to the FOC, as long as θ > θ˜, with
θ˜ =
α
4
. (72)
As mentioned before, we will call this solution dI(α, θ), with dI(α, θ) ∈]0,∞[.
E θ¯ ∈ [0, 1] and θ¯ > θ˜
Implementing d = d¯ in equation 18 and solving it for θ delivers a level of θ as a
function of α, which represents the level of the exogenous effectiveness parameter
for every α ∈]0, αˆ[, so that the interior and the first corner solution of the second
23Since H(α, θ, d) is continuously differentiable (cf. equation (70)), and since every continuously
differentiable function is continuous itself, we know that H(α, d, θ) is a continous function.
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stage apply. That is, if dI = d¯, the restriction on a (a ≥ 0) is non-binding and the
level of d is sufficient to guarantee a = 0:
θ¯ =
1
4
(
2 + α− 2α2),
which is a continuous and concave function of α, with
θ¯max = θ¯
∣∣
α= 1
4
=
17
32
,
so that θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
θ¯ > θ˜
⇔ 1 > α.
Hence, the case separating level of θ always exceeds the minimum level of θ to
guarantee the existence of an interior solution in the first stage (existence of dI(α, θ))
for α ∈]0, αˆ[.
F dI > d¯ for θ < θ¯ et vice versa
As mentioned in the previous section, dI = d¯ if and only if θ = θ¯. Since equation
(21) on page 12 showed that every investment in defense which exceeds d¯ is a waste
of resources, we know that the utility maximzing level of d (d∗) is either dI ∈]0, d¯]
or d¯ with d¯ ≤ dI (cf. equations (22) and (23), page 12). In order to proof that
d ∗(α, θ) =
{
d¯ for θ ∈ ]0, θ¯] ,
dI < d¯ for θ ∈ ]θ¯, 1] , (73)
we now have to show that
dI > d¯ for θ < θ¯ and
dI < d¯ for θ > θ¯.
We already detected that
1. there is a unique level of θ which yields dI = d¯, and that
2. dI(α, θ) is a continuous function.
Moreover, it is obvious that d¯ = α θ is an increasing function of θ. Thus, we only
need to show that
d dI(α, θ)
d θ
∣∣∣∣
dI=d¯
< 0, (74)
i.e., at the unique case separating level of θ (θ¯), when dI = d¯, the gradient of the
continuous function dI , with respect to θ, is negative.
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Using the implicit function theorem, we know that
d dI(α, θ)
d θ
= −
∂ H(α,θ,d)
∂ θ
∂ H(α,θ,d)
∂ d
. (75)
After some calculation we get the following expression:
d dI(α, θ)
d θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ¯,dI=d¯
=
α2
(
3(1− α) + 2α2)
α (2α2 + α+ 1) − 4 , (76)
where the enumerator is unambiguously positive and the denominator negative for
α ∈]0, αˆ[. Thus, d dI(α,θ)
d θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ¯,dI=d¯
is negative, which concludes the proof.
G Collapse of barter exchange is foreclosed in
equilibrium
According to proposition 1, page 9, barter exchange will collapse (2nd corner so-
lution) if the level of defense is equal to or lower than d and α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
. We will
now prove that the collapse of barter exchange is foreclosed in equilibrium (proof of
proposition 2.3, page 11).
Under the terms of proposition 1, the interior solution where neither of the restric-
tions (a ≥ 0 and z ∈ [0, Z]) are binding, applies as long as
d ≤ dI ≤ d¯. (77)
Thus, the following functions apply for α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
a(d) =

−d+
√
d(d+4(1−α)θ)
2 θ
for d ≤ d,√
αd θ−d
θ
for d ∈]d, d¯[,
0 for d ≥ d¯,
(78a)
z(d) =

Z for d ≤ d,
α
√
θZ√
αd+(1−α)
√
θ
for d ∈]d, d¯ [,
αZ for d ≥ d¯,
(78b)
with d¯ = α θ and d = (2α−1)
2θ
α
. Equation 78b tells us that if d is less than or equal to
d, the amount of nonexported goods (z) equals the initial endowment (Z). Hence,
barter exchange collapses. In this case a(d) is reshaped: Now appropriation is the
only means to adopt the foreign good.
At first we are interested in the boundary between interior and second corner solu-
tion. For this we implement d = d in the FOC for an interior solution (equation (18)).
Solving this FOC for θ delivers
θ =
1 + α(α(5− 2α)− 3)
4(1− 2α)2 . (79)
31
θ1
1
θ¯
θ
α
αˆ α˜
Figure 12: θ¯ and θ contingent on α
Thus, there is a unique level of θ for every α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
, so that the interior solution
(dI) equals the level of defense which lets barter exchange vanish (d). In other words,
if θ = θ, the restriction on z (z ∈ [0, Z]) is non-binding and z = Z in equilibrium.
Secondly, we will take a closer look at the properties of this case separating level of
the exogenous relative effectiveness parameter. Equation 80 and 81 show that for α ∈]
1
2
, αˆ
[
(the relevant set of the exogenous preference parameter) θ is a monotonously
decreasing and convex function of α:
d θ
dα
=
1 + 2α(2(1 + α2)− 3α)
4(1− 2α)3 , (80)
d2 θ
dα2
=
5 + 2α
2(1− 2α)4 , (81)
where equation (81) is unambiguously positive for the given set of α. Moreover, the
enumerator of equation (80) is negative and the denominator is positive ∀ α > 1
2
.
Equating the two case separating levels of θ delivers
θ = θ¯
α = 1.
Moreover, θ
∣∣
α→ 1
2
→∞ and θ¯
∣∣
α= 1
2
= 1
2
. Thus,
θ¯ < θ, (82)
as long as α < 1, which is graphically represented in figure 12, with the grey area
representing the accredited set of the exogenous relative effectiveness and preference
parameter.
To sum things up: Our recent findings are
1. that dI is a continuous function and that dI ≤ d¯ as long as θ ≥ θ¯ (cf. section
E, page 29),
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2. θ¯ < θ for α < 1.
3. Moreover, it is easy to verify that d¯ > d as long as α ∈ ]1
3
, 1
[
.
Thus, if we keep in mind that the necessary condition for the collapse of barter
exchange is that α ∈ ]1
2
, αˆ
[
, we know that dI ∈ [d, d¯] as long as θ ∈ [θ¯, θ].
By definition, the exogenous level of θ ∈ [0, 1]. Since θ is a monotonically decreasing
function of α (cf. equation (80)), equating θ to 1 delivers the minimum level of the
exogenous preference parameter, which we will call α˜, to assure that θ ≤ 1. Since
α˜ ≈ 0.7, this forecloses the emergence of market breakdown for α ∈]1
2
, αˆ[ (see figure
12), which concludes the proof.
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